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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether greater level of international integration, 
increased development spending and economic growth improve relations between India 
and Pakistan. The analysis controls for political orientation, defence spending and 
population for both countries. We investigate the causal links between different measures 
of bilateral conflict and these variables in a time series framework running between 1950-
2005 in most instances. Our results suggest that more international trade, improved 
budget allocation for development sector and higher growth rates have been the primary 
determinants of conflict mitigation between India and Pakistan. The export capabilities of 
both countries are key for the peace process to move forward. We also find that India 
Pakistan conflict is the cause of high military expenditures and low/stagnant development 
expenditures in Pakistan over the Last 50 years. Another important finding of the study is 
that a weak relationship exists between conflict mitigation and relative political 
orientation of both countries.  
Keywords: Inter-state conflict and trade, democracy and conflict, conflict and economic 
development.
J.E.L codes: D74, F13, F15, F51.  
1‘The destinies of our two nations are interlinked. We need to put the past behind us’ 
(Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in response to Pakistani President 
Pervez Musharraf’s peace initiatives) The Nation, December 21, 2006
1 INTRODUCTION
International trade allows one country to peacefully benefit from the endowments 
of another nation through peaceful exchange. Furthermore, free trade integrates 
the world economy. An equally viable manner, however, of earning a living is 
through violence, see Skaperdas (1992). War is a way of expropriating the 
endowments of another country, but it is costly as it destroys a part of both 
countries pre-existing wealth. In making a living, predation is an alternative to 
production, but it is not usually the most efficient, as predation (war or other 
forms of larceny) unnecessarily wastes resources. Such, unenlightened behaviour 
may be rational or optimal from the standpoint of the individual person or a 
nation, but is inefficient in the global sense. The work of Francis Edgeworth, 
writing in the late 19th century, provides a useful starting point in understanding 
the economic rationale for violence. Edgeworth distinguished between consent—
and its absence—in human economic interaction:
The first principle of Economics is that every agent is actuated only by self-
interest. The workings of this principle may be viewed under two aspects, 
according as the agent acts without, or with, the consent of others affected by 
his actions. In wide senses, the first species of action may be called war; the 
second, contract. [Edgeworth, 1881, pp 16-17].
In summary, international economic interactions between nations may involve 
peaceful trade, or it could be belligerent with attenuated economic interaction. 
Outright war is just one manifestation of the rivalry between nations; the armed 
peace is equally consistent with aggressiveness. India and Pakistan are a case in 
point. They have had at least four large scale military confrontations (1948, 
1965, 1971 and 1999), but otherwise spend a great deal of time in 
uncompromising posturing vis-à-vis each other. India, in particular, frequently 
accuses Pakistan of sponsoring terrorism in her territory. But occasionally they 
make goodwill gestures, such as sending out peace buses between cities like Delhi 
and Lahore, and agree to cricket tours.  Less frequently, major concessions are 
made mainly by Pakistan, such as President Musharraf’s willingness to put aside 
the long standing Pakistani demand and United Nations resolution for a 
plebiscite to settle the future of Kashmir.1 Figure 1 charts the hostility levels of 
the two states on a scale of 0-6. It has never been below 2, but usually at high 
level of 4, which measures belligerency short of outright war (see variable 
definitions in the appendix).
Polachek (1997) and Polachek and Seiglie (2006) argue that aggressive posturing 
and other forms of belligerent behaviour between states disrupts trade and the 
costs emerge through a deterioration in the terms of trade. Wars and other forms 
1 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3330031.stm.
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of conflict among geographically contiguous states involve greater losses, as more 
efficient geographically proximate trade is displaced, Chang, Polachek and Robst 
(2004).2 This effect, however, depends on the absence of alternative trading 
partners, who despite greater distance may be equally or more efficient. 
Figure 1: Hostility between Pakistan and India
A related issue concerns the so-called democratic peace, see Polachek (1997) and 
Polachek and Seiglie (2006) for a review of this substantial literature. The idea is 
that democracies3 will not fight each other because they share cultural norms 
that militate against forceful dispute resolution, or alternatively the checks and 
balances that characterise political processes in advanced democracies restrain 
violence. Put simply, the idea is that established democracies do not go to war 
with each other, but cooperate instead. Polachek (1997) presents empirical 
evidence to suggest that advanced democracies cooperate, not because of their 
similar political systems, but due to their vast and multiple intersecting economic 
interdependence. Indeed, Robst, Polachek and Chang (2006) present some 
evidence to suggest that more democratic nations could exhibit some degree of 
belligerence to less democratic countries. Their arguments may apply to India-
Pakistan relations, as India is consistently more ‘democratic’ compared to 
2 When we come to comparing trade and conflict with many nations, not just dyadic (pair-wise) 
interactions, Dorussen (1999) argues that although trade reduces conflict, in the presence of many 
countries, an increase in the number of countries or the world’s endowment may induce more 
conflict, as there are more countries to grab from. Formally, it lowers the minimum probability of 
military success needed to make conflict worthwhile in the presence or absence of trade with the 
target country. Hegre (2002) shows that by taking ratios of the probabilities (rather than 
differences as in Dorussen, 1999) the benefits of trade rise as the number of countries increase. 
Thus, Dorussen (1999) establishes gains from conflict after globalization, whereas Hegre (2002) 
models benefits from cooperation (or trade) as globalization gathers pace.  
 
3 Mainly, advanced OECD nations that are long standing democracies, not new democracies in the 
developing world following the cold war.  
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5. India's Polity 2 score
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Pakistan. Also, increased democratic levels can mandate concessions and re-
negotiation with neighbours. 
Figure 2: Pakistan-India Conflict, Defence, Development and Democracy trends
The Polity score of democracy ranges from 0-10, with advanced industrialised 
democracies usually getting 10. Similarly there is an autocracy score of between -
10 to 0. Together, the autocracy and democracy score gives us an average Polity 
2 score, acting as an indicator of the overall political system, which is graphed 
above. Graph 5 in figure 2 shows that India has one of the highest democracy 
scores in the developing world for the entire 50 year period (7-9), whereas 
Pakistan’s experience with democracy is more mixed with high autocracy scores 
at continuous time intervals, associated with military coups in 1958, 1969, 1977 
and 1999. 
Comparisons of graphs 2 and 3 above indicates that military expenditures tend to 
move inversely with development (education) expenditure, providing prima facie 
evidence that large military expenditure crowds out development in the social 
sector. Pakistan’s military expenditure is consistently above India’s except in the 
mid-1960s when India had wars with both China and Pakistan. In Pakistan’s 
case, military expenditure as a proportion of GDP has historically been at 5%, 
but rising during and after its 1965 and 1971 wars with India to as high as 8%. 
The average defence expenditure of Pakistan is 5.5% of GDP in the 1950-2005 
period, whereas for India is about half at 2.8% of GDP. Since the 1990s 
Pakistan’s military expenditure has been falling, and is now at a little above 4% 
of GDP, which represents a historical low. As Indian education expenditure rose 
to 4 % of GDP in the1990s, its defence expenditure fell from nearly 4% of GDP 
in the mid-1960s to less than 3% of GDP (it has rarely been below 2% of GDP). 
Pakistan’s education public expenditure is stagnating at around 2% of GDP.
Growth, a robust indicator of economic development, has been quite volatile for 
both countries over the period of last 50 years. The opportunity costs of conflict 
rise, when countries move to higher stages of economic development, as they 
have more to lose from conflict, and are have more resources to negotiate 
peaceful settlements. The 1990s is considered to be a golden decade for India as 
GDP growth rates reached a high of 8%, while on average Indian economy grew 
at 5 to 6% annually, along with a significant decline in poverty. On economic 
development front, Pakistan’s GDP growth rate shows greater volatility 
4compared to India. Though Pakistan has been growing at an average of 6% for 
the last 3 to 4 years, it is making up for lost time in the recent past. 
Traditionally, since the early 1960s up to the early 1990s, Pakistan’s was the 
faster growing economy of the two.  But India is currently growing faster, and it 
also did so in the 1950s. Both countries are in track to meet the millennium 
development goals with regard to poverty, and both nations are in the 
There is more to India Pakistan conflict than merely Pakistan’s political 
orientation and a comparison of bilateral economic growth rates. This is because 
of the fact that despite high growth rates and relatively high democracy scores in 
Pakistan up to 1999, conflict between the countries escalated in the 1990s. 
Furthermore, the current regime in Pakistan with a strong military orientation 
(the military is highly influential and the President continues to be the army 
chief), and therefore less democratic, is making major unilateral concessions to 
India vis-à-vis their long standing disputes over Kashmir. Could that be related 
to the very recent impressive growth record in Pakistan?  If anything, conflict 
between the two nations can be best understood in a multivariate framework 
where the relevant variables and processes (economic performance, integration 
with rest of the world, trade between the conflicting nations, defence spending, 
military expenditure, population and so on) are simultaneously taken into 
account. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether greater inter-state 
trade, democracy and reduced military spending lower belligerence between India 
and Pakistan. We also investigate the causal links between bilateral conflict and 
most of these variables in a time series framework, running between 1950-2005 in 
most cases. The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 contains the 
econometric analysis and section 3 concludes.   
2 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A Hypotheses
H1: Greater international trade lowers various forms of inter-state conflict.
H2: Development expenditure (such as public spending on education) should lower 
conflict.
H3: GDP growth will decrease inter-state conflict.
H4: Increases in dyadic democracy scores will lead to less conflict. Increased 
democracy may lower the cost of concessions and compromise with former 
enemies.
Our first hypothesis relates to the work of Polachek (1997). We utilise a metric of 
total openness, which measures a country’s dependence on foreign trade to gauge 
the conflict reducing properties of international trade. Secondly, development 
expenditure (say on education) is likely to lower conflict, because it implies lesser 
military spending, and increased income in the future which increases the utility of 
citizens via increased consumption. It also lowers poverty. Thirdly, increased per-
capita income reduces conflict as people have more to lose from the destructiveness 
of war or confrontation (there is less poverty) and more to gain from trade, see 
Lipset’s (1960) hypotheses about the modernising and beneficial effects of 
economic growth on democratic development and peace. Higher growth also 
5makes granting concessions to rivals less costly, as there are more resources going 
around, which may help to buy-off the disaffected. Finally, we postulate that 
increased dyadic democracy (in this case Pakistan’s, as India is a stable 
democracy) lowers conflict because of the theories of the democratic peace, as well 
as the possibility that higher democracy may also lower the political costs of 
making concessions to rivals, as states are democratically mandated and less 
answerable to special interest groups, including the military.      
B Data and Methodology
B.1. Data
Since inter-state conflict involves at least two parties, it is a dyadic concept. We 
will also construct dyadic proxies for India-Pakistan inter-state trade, military 
burden, development expenditure, economic development and democracy to test 
the five hypotheses we have presented above. Data definitions are to be found in 
the appendix.
B.1.1. Measuring Conflict:
The literature on inter-state conflict classifies conflict data sets into two categories: 
1) war data and 2) events data (Polachek and Seiglie, 2006). War data sets focus on 
more hostile aspects of inter-state interactions such as crises, wars or militarised 
inter-state disputes (Jones, Bremer and Singer, 1996).  The most comprehensive 
wars data set is available under Correlates of War Project (COW) which has 
updated war data sets employed by Wright (1942), Richardson (1960), and Singer 
and Small (1972). The data set covers all major militarized inter-state disputes in 
which one or more states threaten, display, or use force against one or more other 
states between 1816 and 2001. The data provides coded information on fatality 
levels, hostility levels, duration of the conflict, highest action taken by state in the 
dispute. The only un-coded information relates to the precise number of deaths. 
The other major data set on inter-state armed conflict is hosted by the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Project (UCDP) with the collaboration of the International Peace 
Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) and is collected on an annual basis and covers the 
full post-World War II period, 1946–2003. The data set provides coded 
information on the intensity level of the conflict. There are two different intensity 
levels: 1) minor armed conflict and 2) wars. The PRIO data set provides 
information on annual battle deaths. The battle deaths data set is available for use 
with the Correlates of Wars in the period 1900–97. UCDP also provides 
information on precise battle deaths in inter-state armed conflicts for 2002-05. 
Events data focuses on all inter-state events and bilateral interactions reported in 
newspapers. McClelland’s (1978) World Events Interaction Survey (WIES) is 
probably the first of its kind based on bilateral interactions, occurring between 
1966-1992, reported in New York Times. The WEIS data set codes every reported 
event into 22 broad categories ranging from extending aid to military assaults 
6Total Trade/GDP for India and Pakistan
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
19
50
19
54
19
58
19
62
19
66
19
70
19
74
19
78
19
82
19
86
19
90
19
94
19
98
20
02
Years
Iopen
Popen
using force. Azar’s (1980) Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) is an 
extensive longitudinal collection of about one million daily events reported from 
forty seven newspaper sources between 1948-1978. The data set codes events into 
15 broader categories representing different kinds of conflict and cooperation. 
Catogories 1 (voluntary unification) through 7 (minor official exchanges) represent 
cooperation and categories 9 (mild verbal expressions displaying discord) through 
15 (extensive war acts causing deaths) represent conflict. Then there is Virtual 
Research Associates (VRA) data set which is derived from dyadic events reported 
in wire services and covers inter-state interactions from 1990-2001 (Polachek and 
Seiglie, 2006). 
Since we are interested in the evolution of India-Pakistan conflict over a period of 
the last 55 years, we will use Uppsala/PRIO and COW inter-state war data set 
instead of events based data sets because the former data sets provide conflict data 
which covers most of the period of 55 years (1950-2005) which we have selected for 
our analysis. The events data set is not available for longer period of times, and 
thus may not provide information on the evolution of conflict in a longer term. 
Though the events data set captures daily observations, our macroeconomic and 
democracy data varies annually which limits the use of daily information on 
conflict. Secondly, as we showed in figure 1 in section 1, hostility between India 
and Pakistan has usually been high in most of last 55 years, enabling the COW 
data set to capture the severity of conflict in most years of the dispute. 
Consistently high hostility levels between the two countries, more number of years 
covered by COW and Uppsala data sets, and the availability of macroeconomic 
and democracy data on an annual basis limits the scope of using the events data 
sets. 
B.1.2. Measuring Trade and the Military Burden: 
India and Pakistan are active nations in international trading markets as can be 
seen in figure 3. 
Figure 3: Patterns in Pakistan and India Trade 
We construct 4 dyadic proxies to 
capture combined integration level 
for both countries. Pakistan’s total 
trade as a ratio of India’s total trade 
(xmpi) and India’s total trade as a 
ratio of Pakistan’s total trade 
(xmip) are the first two indicators. 
Since exports are more growth 
enhancing and thus more effective 
for conflict mitigation than imports, we differentiate between exports and imports 
by taking both countries’ total exports as a percentage of the sum of their GDPs 
(xpi), as well as total imports separately as a percentage of the sum of their GDPs 
(mpi). 
7Military expenditures can reflect hostility, as well as deterrence (Ploacheck and 
Seglie, 2006).  In the Pakistan-India case, we would like to examine how each 
county’s military expenditure/ military burden affects the dispute. Figure 2 in 
section 1 shows that Pakistan’s spending on military expenditure as a proportion of 
GDP is higher than India’s. Additionally, since military expenditures may also 
capture the capability of a country to deal with civil unrest or intra-state conflict, 
Indian military expenditure can also be explained in terms of the high prevalence of 
continuing intra-state conflicts in various regions of India. Pakistan has had fewer 
civil wars. This may mean that Pakistan’s military burden captures its security 
concerns vis-à-vis India solely. If so, dyadic variables which take the military 
burden of Pakistan as a ratio of the Indian military burden, should affect conflict 
positively and vice versa. We construct 5 different proxies of military burden 
utilising data on military expenditures as well as military personnel from Correlates 
of Wars: 1. Pakistan’s defence expenditure over GDP as a ratio of India’s defence 
expenditure over GDP (milbrd 1) 2. India’s defence expenditure over GDP as a ratio 
of Pakistan’s defence expenditure over GDP (milbrd 2). 3. Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over GDP as a ratio of Pakistan’s defence expenditure over GDP plus 
India’s defence expenditure over GDP (milbrd 3). 4. India’s defence expenditure 
over GDP as a ratio of Pakistan’s defence expenditure over GDP plus India’s 
defence expenditure over GDP (milbrd4). 5. The average of India’s defence 
expenditure over GDP and Pakistan’s defence expenditure over GDP (milbrd5). 
B.1.3. Measuring Democracy, Economic Development and Other Determinants of 
Conflict: 
The conflict literature suggests that politically similar regime types share peace 
(Henderson, 2002). Secondly more democratisation leads to more peace as 
democracies are less prone to fight with each other (Polachek and Seglie, 2006).  To 
capture democracy levels for India and Pakistan, we turn to the Polity IV project 
hosted by Center of International Development and Conflict Management 
(CIDCM). Polity IV contains coded annual information on regime and authority 
characteristics for all independent states (with a population greater than 500,000) 
in the global state system, and covers the years 1800-2004. The data set captures 
general openness of political institutions by providing country level democracy 
scores ranging 0 to 10, where 0 is the lowest value for democracy and 10 the 
highest. Similarly, autocracy measures the general closedness of political 
institutions ranging from 0 to 10, whereas 0 depicts lowest values of autocracy and 
10 highest. Polity IV also computes a combined polity score by subtracting 
autocracy scores from the democracy scores for the corresponding year. The value 
of this Polity score ranges from -10 to 10, where -10 denotes the highest autocracy 
level, and 10 the maximum democracy score. We have graphed the Polity score for 
India and Pakistan in figure 3 from 1950 to 2005. Although India always takes a 
high positive value of 7 or above, Pakistan frequently takes on negative values. 
We construct a dyadic variable of democracy for both countries by combining 
multiplying their Polity scores, following Polachek and Seiglie (2006) for example. 
Before multiplying the Polity scores of both countries, we add 10 to each countries 
polity series. This is to make the negative Polity values positive so that our 
combined democracy score may capture the variations in the democratization 
process only on a positive scale. The dyadic democracy variable shows values as 
8low as 50 on the scale of 0 to 400 when there are high levels of political 
dissimilarities between Pakistan (dictatorship) and India (democracy), and as high 
as 350 when both countries are governed by democracies (see figure 4). 
Figure 4: Dyadic democracy scores for Pakistan and India
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As hypothesized above, conflict between two nations may abate with economic 
growth as states approach higher average income levels, or if they divert funds 
from the military towards social development. Here we take the mean average of 
India and Pakistan’s real GDP per capita growth rates and the mean average of 
India and Pakistan’s education expenditures as a proportion of respective GDPs as 
dyadic proxies for economic and social development respectively.4 We constructed 
the series for both countries by dividing GDP at constant prices taken from 
economic surveys, and dividing it by population levels. The data was later tallied 
with GDP per capita series available at World Development Indicators (2006) 
version. India and Pakistan are one of the most highly populated countries in the 
world. Pakistan has 160 million inhabitants, and India has over a billion citizens. 
In line with the earlier literature, we also take mean average of both countries 
populations as a standardising variable in our analysis (i.e. see Polachek, 1997). 
B.2. Methodology:
We have identified trade, military burden, the level of economic development (per 
capita GDP growth rates), development expenditure and democracy as key 
determinants of conflict. Before we carry out the econometric analysis, it is 
important to note that there could be a two-way causality between several pairs of 
variables. For example, more trade not only mitigates conflict, but conflict may 
also lead to diminished trade. Greater trade integration with the rest of the world 
may also enhance growth. At least in case of India, its economic success has largely 
been attributed to the country’s open policies in 1990s. Defence expenditures with 
levels as high as India and Pakistan are a definite impediment to their social and 
economic development. Additionally, development expenditure especially 
education expenditure may not only determine economic progress through the 
4 There is an insufficiently long time series for public health spending data for India. 
9accumulation of human capital but it is also the case that economic progress and 
growth improves fiscal capabilities of a nation. In short, there are potential 
endogenity and interdependence between conflict, trade, economic development 
and budgetary allocations on defence and development. Figure 5 shows the 
direction of causality among variables.  Since, all developed countries have high 
GDP per capita incomes, follow more open economic policies, and  democracies; 
democracy not only explains conflict but also level of development in a country. 
Please note that here democracy and population are pure exogenous concepts 
determining or affecting rest of the variables. 
Figure 5:  Endogeneity between Conflict, Trade, Military Burden, Development 
Expenditure and Economic Progress
                                 
                                                             Conflict
    Bilateral /                     Military                  Development               Economic                                                                    
  Multilateral                    Burden                  Expenditure                  Progress
      Trade                   
 
                                                                  
Population                                                                                               Democracy
Any simple least square regression analysis may lead to spurious results due to 
endogeniety among our variables. We need to utilize a simultaneous equation 
model where potential endogenieties between various variables are addressed. 
Since we have time series data, we can use a Vector Autoregressive model (VAR) 
which is an extension of univariate autoregressive (AR) models to capture the 
evolution and the interdependencies between our multiple time series (Sims, 1980).  
All variables in a VAR are treated symmetrically by including for each variable an 
equation explaining its evolution based on its own lags, and the lags of other 
variables in the model. The number of equations in a VAR model depends upon 
the number of endogenous variables, where each endogenous variable is regressed 
on its lagged value and the lagged values of all other endogenous variables, as well 
as a number of exogenous variables. This solves the endogeniety problem. In this 
sense the VAR model is just a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model with 
lagged variables and/or deterministic terms as common regressors, such that the 
10
regression results for each equation can be interpreted in the same manner as we 
do for ordinary least square estimators. 
After fitting a VAR we may want to know which way causalities go. One way to 
do that is by running Granger causality tests after the VAR analysis, see Granger 
(1969). 
B.3. Results: 
This section reports the results of the multivariate VAR regression analysis. Proxies 
for conflict, bilateral and multilateral trade, economic progress, military burden and 
social development will be treated as endogenous variables, whereas democracy and 
population will be treated as purely exogenous concepts.  Before we carry out 
regression analysis, a test for stationarity is in order for all dyadic variables employed 
in our analysis. In case any of our time series variables are non-stationary, appropriate 
lags are taken to solve for the problem of autocorrelation. Stationarity tests are carried 
out by running modified Dicky-Fuller t-test also known as the DF-GLS test proposed 
by Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock (1996). The DF-GLS test is an augmented Dickey-
Fuller test, where the time series is transformed via a generalised least squares (GLS) 
regression before performing the test and this approach has been shown to have 
significantly greater power than the previous versions of augmented Dickey-Fuller 
tests. 
We ran DF-GLS on econometric program STATA which provides results of three 
methods for choosing which value of lag to use. These methods are (1) the Ng-Perron 
sequential t, (2) the minimum Schwarz information criterion (SIC), and (3) the Ng-
Perron modified Akaike information criterion (MAIC). Maximum lags are chosen for 
each DF-GLS test according to Schwert (1989) criteria.  Table 1 provides unit root 
test results based on Ng-Perron Sequential t. The results show that nearly all variables 
have unit roots. Autocorrelation among conflict variables is solved at lag (1). Among 
variables which capture multilateral trade levels for India and Pakistan, Xmpi and 
Xmip become stationary at lags (4) and (8) respectively. The mean average of India 
and Pakistan’s exports Xpi is stationary at (0) lags, whereas Ng-Perron Sequential t-
test suggests that optimal lag length which solves for the problem of autocorrelation in 
the series for mean average of imports Mpi is (1). The first four proxies of military 
burden Milbrd1, Milbrd2, Milbrd3 and Milbrd4 are all stationary at lag (5). The mean 
average of India and Pakistan military expenditures is stationary at lag (9).Combined 
India and Pakistan  democracy scores Demopi and mean average of both countries’ 
populations Poppi become stationary at lags (7) and (10) respectively. Mean average 
of real GDP per capita growth rates Gpi show no significant signs of auto correlation 
and are stationary at lag (0).
Table 1: 
DF-GLS Unit Root Tests
Variables Lag length With intercept With intercept and trend
Fatal 1 -3.528* (Ng-Perron) -3.774* (Ng-Perron)
Volfatal 1 -4.789* (Ng-Perron) -4.844* (Ng-Perron)
11
Dur 1 -4.058* (Ng-Perron) -4.233* (Ng-Perron)
Hiact 1 -2.382** (Ng-Perron) -2.590 (Ng-Perron)
Hstlev 1 -2.371** (Ng-Perron) -2.512  (Ng-Perron) 
Cnf 1 -3.025* (Ng-Perron) -4.082*  (Ng-Perron)
Tpitp 15 -1.112*** (Ng-Perron) -1.861  (Ng-Perron)
Tpiti 15 -3.856*  (MAIC) -3.319** (Ng-Perron)
Xmpi 2 -2.710* (Ng-Perron) -2.860*** (Ng-Perron)
Xmip 8 -4.951*  (MAIC) -4.923*   (MAIC)
Lxpi1 0 2.951** (D-Fuller) 2.951**  (D-Fuller)
Lxpi2 0 -4.769* (SIC) -4.929* (SIC)
Lmpi1 1 -4.049* (SIC) -3.961* (SIC)
Lmpi2 1 -4.511* (SIC) -4.382* (SIC)
Lmilbrd1 5 -2.209** (Ng-Perron) -2.795*** (Ng-Perron)
Lmilbrd2 5 -2.209**(Ng-Perron) -2.795***(Ng-Perron)
Lmilbrd3 5 -1.911***(Ng-Perron) -2.686***(Ng-Perron)
Lmilbrd4 5 -2.128***(Ng-Perron) -2.831***(Ng-Perron)
Lmilbrd5 1 -4.735* (SIC) -4.748* (SIC)
Lmilbrd6 0 - -4.308* (SIC)
Lmilppi 1 -4.082* (SIC) -4.098* (SIC)
Lmilpip 1 -4.082* (SIC) -4.098* (SIC)
Ledupi1 1  - -5.374* (SIC)
Gpi 0 -4.256* (Ng-Perron) -4.276* (Ng-Perron)
Demopi 7 -2.790* (Ng-Perron) -2.997* (Ng-Perron)
Poppi 10 - -7.392* (MAIC)
-*, ** and *** shows significance at 1%, 5%and 10% level
-  The Lag structure is selected through (1) Ng - Perron sequential t (Ng-Perron), (2) the minimum Schwarz information criterion 
(SIC), (3) the Ng-Perron modified information criterion (MAIC) and (4) Dickey-Fuller test (D-Fuller). 
We can now proceed to VAR analysis. Our reduced form VAR model for conflict is 
as follows
 tttititititititititititt PDemoGEMilTrConfConf   87,6,5,4,3,21 
(1)
Where , , , , , and depict inter-state conflict, tConf itTr  itMil  itE  itG  tDemo tP
multilateral trade, military burden, education expenditure, real growth rate of 
GDP per capita, democracy score and population for India and Pakistan 
respectively, t ranges from 1950-2005 and . Here is the optimal lag pi ,....,1 p
structure for the VAR model. and are metrics (for it,2 it,3 it,4 it,5 it,6 )66( 
every ).pi ,....,1
The model above is run for Fatal under multiple specifications of bilateral and 
multilateral trade and the military burden to see how trade between Pakistan and 
India, their integration levels with the outside world and their military 
expenditures have determined the severity of their dispute over time. We have 
chosen Fatal because it captures severity of the conflict. Later, we also employ 
other conflict proxies in our analysis. Through out the analysis, mean averages of 
India and Pakistan’s education expenditures (Edupi), real GDP per-capita growth 
rates (Gpi), population size (Poppi) and combined democracy scores (Demopi) 
remain common regressors.  
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Table 2 employs different proxies of multilateral trade (Xmpi, Xmip, Xpi and 
Mpi) with corresponding combinations of military burden (Milbrd1, Milbrd2, 
Milbrd3 and Milbrd4) to see how integration with the global economy has affected 
the India-Pakistan conflict. Xmpi and Xmip enter equation 1 negatively and 
significantly. The higher values of for Xmip, when compared to Xmpi, it,3
suggests that higher Indian levels of trade integration mitigate conflict more than 
when Pakistani openness rises. This may indicate that economic progress in South 
Asia heavily depends on Indian economic performance. The mean averages of 
India-Pakistan total exports (Xpi) is also negatively related to conflict, and highly 
significant at 1 percent level.  The values of have increased further, indicating it,3
that the more these two countries are able to export to rest of the world, the lower 
are the levels of bilateral conflict. The high coefficients of Xmpi can lead us to 
infer that the explanatory power for Xpi comes more from the Indian side. Both 
countries are at similar rungs on the technological ladder, and share the potential 
to export to the rest of the world, along with the likes of China. The last two 
columns in table 2 show the results for mean average of total imports of Pakistan 
and India (Mpi). For both specifications, Mpi is insignificant, but the negative 
signs do reaffirm the case for a positive role of trade in dispute resolution. 
In contrast to defense expenditure, which is positively related to conflict, efforts to 
improve human capital by allocating more funds to education are a strong 
determinant of conflict mitigation. Edupi always enters the conflict regression 
equation with a negative sign, and is significant mostly. The high values of it,5
indicate that investment in education may go a long way in building peace. The 
mean average of Pakistan and Indian per-capita growth rates (Gpi) are negatively 
and significantly related with Fatal in all 16 specifications confirming the 
hypothesis that countries are more peaceful when they are moving forward 
economically. The combined democracy score (Demopi) is always negatively 
related to conflict, and significant also. However, the low values of democracy 
coefficients suggest that political orientation has played a more limited role in the 
India-Pakistan conflict. Our results also show that the high levels of population in 
both countries, where a significant proportion are uneducated and poor on both 
sides, contribute positively to the conflict, although the effect is small. 
 Further robustness checks, under additional specifications, are carried out on 
equation 12 with different proxies of conflict (i.e, Fatal, Volfatal, Cnfpi, Dur, 
Hstlvl and Hiact). Each definition of conflict is regressed on Milbrd1, Milbrd2 and 
Milbrd5, whereas Xpi, Edupi, Gpi, Demopi and Poppi make up the common set of 
regressors in a total of 18 specifications. The results are given in table 3 (appendix 
1). They confirm the validity of all the 4 hypotheses proposed at start of our 
empirical section. More trade, increased education expenditure, higher GDP per 
capita growth rates, a greater democratic orientation, all exert a downward 
pressure on conflict, as all of these variables are significant in most cases, and 
always carry the right signs. A comparison of coefficients , and  it,2 it,4 it,5 it,6
suggest that integration with the world has by far the most dominant effect on 
conflict mitigation than any other variable. Education spending comes second in 
its effectiveness in enhancing peace.  The results in table 3 also show that annual 
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battle deaths, severity of conflict, duration of escalation, hostility levels and 
highest hostility level decrease when both countries score high on democracy. 
However persistently low values taken by democracy  mean that political t,7
orientation plays a less prominent role in explaining the severity of dispute or 
levels of escalation. There is some evidence that these countries have entered into 
outright war even when both were democracies. The ‘Kargil’ war of 1999 is a case 
in point when both countries were scoring high in democracy. By contrast, the 
long military stand off between India and Pakistan in 2002, occurred at a time 
when Pakistan was highly autocratic. 
Since we have run a VAR model, the problem of endogneity among variables have 
been addressed. It would be interesting to run multivariate Granger causality tests 
to see if causality runs from the determinants of conflict to conflict, and whether 
there are also cases of reverse causality as is shown in figure 5.  We ran Granger 
causality test for each VAR specification for which we present results in tables 2 
and table 3. A summary of Granger causality tests are provided in table 4 
(appendix 1) for all endogenous and exogenous regressors of conflict, and where 
there is an instance of reverse causality it is noted. The results in table 4 show that 
all regressors except Milbrd5 and Mpi Granger cause conflict. We do not witness 
any instances of reverse causality except for Milbrd2 in case of Fatal and Edupi in 
case of Fatal and Dur. These observed instances of reverse causality mean that 
high levels of conflict between India and Pakistan lower India’s military 
expenditure as a proportion of Pakistan’s military expenditure. One interpretation 
may be that a military build up by Pakistan increases when hostilities between the 
countries rise. This may be true because dominant role of the army and high 
military expenditures in Pakistan are justified due to continuous high levels of 
hostility with its neighbour. Otherwise, Pakistan doesn’t have any major dispute 
with any other nation, or frequent instances of intra-state disputes to justify the 
high budget allocation for defense. The greater allocation of funds for defense due 
to ongoing conflict, may also strangle development spending. The reverse causality 
from conflict to education expenditure could explain this process. 
3. Conclusions
Pakistan and India’s successful integration with world markets is the most 
dominant motivating factor for peace. Education spending has been shown to be 
good for both peace and economic progress. Secondly the conflict between the two 
nations is the prime cause of high military expenditures in Pakistan. Any peace 
deal between India and Pakistan would enable the government of Pakistan to 
divert precious resources from defense to development. 
In an ideal world increased dyadic democracy reduces inter-state hostility, but the 
relationship in our case is present but weak. Peace initiatives are not the sole 
prerogative of democracies; they can also be made by countries who are less 
democratic. Economic progress and poverty reduction combined with greater 
openness to international trade in general are more significant drivers of peace 
between nations, rather than a common democratic political orientation. In many 
ways, our results echo Polcahek’s (1997) work, where he argues that democracies 
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cooperate not because they have common political systems, but because their 
economies are intricately and intensively inter-dependent. Furthermore, 
meaningfully functioning democracies cannot exist where poverty is so acute and 
endemic, even in ostensibly democratic nations such as India. Lastly, it may be 
democracy, itself, that is a by-product of increased general prosperity, as suggested 
a long time ago by Seymour Lipset (1960). 
Our analysis show that current government of Pakistan has rightly taken the 
initiative to bring India back to the negotiation table for settlements of bilateral 
issues like Kashmir dispute which is much of a cause for tensions between the two 
nations for the last 60 years since the two countries got their independence in 1947. 
Furthermore, as a two prong strategy towards peace, the government of Pakistan 
has combined dispute settlement initiatives with increased trade incentives for 
India, as Pakistan will announce a further 5% decrease in tariff reductions on 1077 
Indian products by the beginning of 2007. 
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APPENDIX:
Table 2
                                  VAR Regression Equations for Fatal under multiple specifications of BiLateral Trade and Military Burden
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Bilateral Trade
Tpitp (16) -0.30* -0.30* -0.32* -0..28* -0.24** -0.23** -0.22**
Tpiti (16) -0.76*** -0.76*** -0.83** -0.70*** -0.61*** -0.64*** 0.55***
Military Burdeñ̃̃̃̃̃    
lmilbrd1 (6) 2.33*** 2.02
lmilbrd2 (6) -2.33*** -2.02
lmilbrd3 (6) 6.53*** 6.03
lmilbrd4 (6) -3.45 -2.84
lmilbrd5 (2) 6.84** 6.54**
lmilbrd6 (1) 3.26*** 3.52***
Lmilppi(2) -1.80
Lmilpip(2) 1.79
Social Development
Ledupi1(2) -4.98 -4.98 -4.83 -5.09*** -6.35** -8.34* -6.08** -6.07*** -6.07*** -6.19*** -6.02*** -5.97** -8.35* -6.10**
Economic Growth
Gpi (1) -0.40* -0.40* -0.41* -0.40* -0.28* -0.35* -0.34* -0.39* -0.39* -0.39* -0.39* -0.31* -0.38* -0.37*
Exogenous Variables
Demopi (7) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003*** -0.004***
Poppi (10) 0.064* 0.064* 0.063* 0.066* 0.112* 0.094* 0.076* 0.063* 0.063* 0.062* 0.064* 0.101* 0.088* 0.072*
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
R2 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.63 0.61 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.61 0.59 0.57
VAR(p) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2)
-*, **, *** shows significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level
- VAR(p) reports lag-order for each VAR model based on final prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) and the Hannan and 
Quinn information criterion (HQIC),
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Table 3
                                  VAR Regression Equations for Fatal under multiple specifications of Multilateral Trade and Military Burden
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Mutilateral Trade
Xmpi(3) -0.71 -0.71 -0.75 -0.74 -0.62 -0.77*** -0.75***
Xmip(9) -3.74* -3.74* -3.77* -3.74* -3.89* -2.68* -3.83*
Military Burdeñ̃̃̃̃̃    
lmilbrd1 (6) 0.08 -0.18
lmilbrd2 (6) -0.08 0.18
lmilbrd3 (6) 0.91 0.27
lmilbrd4 (6) -0.58 0.50
lmilbrd5 (2) 0.04 -0.49
lmilbrd6 (1) 3.38** 2.26***
Lmilppi(2) -1.02
Lmilpip(2) 0.92
Social Development
Ledupi1(2) -3.64* -3.64* -3.59* -3.69* -3.60* -8.07* -2.85* -4.73* -4.73* -4.67* -4.79* -4.44** -7.70* -4.22*
Economic Growth
Gpi (1) -0.37* -0.37* -0.37* -0.38* -0.37* -0.34* -0.37* -0.40* -0.40* -0.39* -0.40* -0.40* -0.36* -0.39*
Exogenous Variables
Demopi (7) -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.005* -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.005* -0.006* -0.006* -0.005*
Poppi (10) 0.067* 0.067* 0.066* 0.067* 0.066* 0.094* 0.062* 0.083* 0.083* 0.082* 0.084* 0.078* 0.101* 0.075*
N 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
R2 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.46 0.42 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.46
VAR(p) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1)
-*, **, *** shows significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level
- VAR(p) reports lag-order for each VAR model based on final prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) and the Hannan and 
Quinn information criterion (HQIC),
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Table: 4
           VAR Regression Equations for Fatal under multiple specifications of Exports, Imports and Military Burden
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Mutilateral Trade
Lxpi1(1) -4.24* -4.03* -3.96*
Lxpi2(1) -7.89* -7.15* -4.78*
Lmpi1(2) -0.36 -0.17 0.03
Lmpi2(2) -0.71 -0.59 -0.33
Military Burdeñ̃̃̃̃̃ª    
Lmilbrd3 (6) 2.19 5.84** 0.39 0.30
Lmilbrd4(6) -0.66 -2.34*** 0.44 0.37
lmilbrd6 (1) 3.51* 2.42*** 3.19** 3.09**
Social Development
Ledupi1(2) -1.96 -2.08*** -7.13* -2.87* -2.89* -7.02* -3.97* -4.19* -8.66* -4.01* -4.13* -8.43*
Economic Growth
Gpi (1) -0.36* -0.36* -0.35* -0.39* -0.39* -0.39* -0.34* -0.36* -0.33* -0.34* -0.35* -0.33*
Exogenous Variables
Demopi (7) -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.006* -0.005* -0.005*
Poppi (10) 0.122* 0.120* 0.154* 0.077* 0.075* 0.103* 0.077* 0.078* 0.104* 0.074* 0.075* 0.103*
N 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
R2 0.50 0.49 0.55 0.58 0.55 0.55 0.40 0.40 0.45 0.40 0.40 0.44
VAR(p) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1)
-*, **, *** shows significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level
- VAR(p) reports lag-order for each VAR model based on final prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) and the Hannan and 
Quinn information criterion (HQIC),
- ª Results for Lmilbrd1, Lmilbrd2, Lmilbrd5, Lmilppi and Lmilpip are also utilised and the results do not change. (See tables 3a and 3b for details)
Table 5. Granger Causality Wald Tests
Direction of Causality Causes RC Direction of Causality Causes RC
FatalXmpi  (√)** × CnfpiEdupi  (√)* ×
FatalXmip  (√)* × CnfpiGpi  (√)* ×
FatalXpi  (√)* × DurXpi  (√)* ×
FatalMpi   × × DurMilbrd 1 × ×
FatalMilbrd 1 (√)** × DurMilbrd 2 (√)** ×
FatalMilbrd 2 (√)** √ DurMilbrd 5 × ×
FatalMilbrd 3 (√)* × DurEdupi  (√)* √
FatalMilbrd 4 (√)* × DurGpi  × ×
FatalMilbrd 5 × × HstlvlXpi  (√)* ×
FatalEdupi  (√)** √ HstlvlMilbrd 1 (√)* ×
FatalGpi  (√)* × HstlvlMilbrd 2 (√)* ×
VolfatalXpi  (√)*** × HstlvlMilbrd 5 × ×
VolfatalMilbrd 1 (√)* × HstlvlEdupi  (√)* ×
VolfatalMilbrd 2 (√)* × HstlvlGpi  (√)*** ×
VolfatalMilbrd 5 × × HiactXpi  (√)*** ×
VolfatalEdupi  × × HiactMilbrd 1 (√)*** ×
VolfatalGpi  (√)*** × HiactMilbrd 2 (√)*** ×
CnfpiXpi  (√)* × HiactMilbrd 5 × ×
CnfpiMilbrd 1 (√)* × HiactEdupi  (√)* ×
CnfpiMilbrd 2 (√)* × HiactGpi  (√)*** ×
CnfpiMilbrd 5 × ×
*, **, *** shows significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, RC stands for reverse 
causation, √ means causes and × means does not cause
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DATA and SOURCES
Dyadic Variables: 
     
Cnfpi: Intensity of Conflict between Pakistan and India, Scores 1 (Minor) when 25 to 999 
battle-related deaths and 2 (War) when at least 1000 battle-related deaths in a given year, 
Years: 1950-2003, UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data set Version IV, Harbom et al (2006)
Demopi: Pakistan and India’s combine democracy score (by adding 10 to India and 
Pakistan’s Polity2 values for each year and then taking the product of  these values in order 
to covert the variable in dyadic form), Years; 1950-2003
Dur: Number of days a conflict lasts in a year between Pakistan and India, Years: 1950-2003, 
Source: COW Inter-State War Data, Version 3.02, Faten et al (2004). 
Fatal: Annual fatality level of conflict between Pakistan and India, scores from 0 to 6
0 None
1 1-25 Deaths
2 26-100 Deaths
3 101-250 Deaths
4 251-500 Deaths
5 501-999 Deaths
6>999 Deaths
Years: 1950-2003, Source: COW Inter-State War Data, Version 3.02, Faten et al (2004)
Gpi: Weighted average of real GDP per capita growth rates for Pakistan and India, Years: 
1950 to 2005. Sources: Pakistan Economic Survey, Indian Economic Survey, International 
Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF)
Hiact: Highest action by Pakistan and India in annual corresponding dispute [bracketed 
numbers refer to corresponding hostility level]
0    No militarised action [1]
1    Threat to use force   [2]
2    Threat to blockade
3    Threat to occupy territory [2]
4    Threat to declare war [2]
5    Threat to use CBR weapons  [2]
6    Threat to join war
7    Show of force  [3]
8     Alert  [3]
9     Nuclear alert   [3]
10   Mobilisation   [3]
11   Fortify border   [3]
12   Border violation   [3]
13   Blockade     [4]
14   Occupation of territory    [4]
15   Seizure    [4]
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16   Attack     [4]
17   Clash       [4]
18   Declaration of war    [4]
19   Use of CBR weapons  [5]
20   Begin inter-state war   [5]
21   Join inter-state war    [5]
Years: 1950-2003, Source: COW Inter-State War Data, Version 3.02, Faten et al (2004)
Hstlev:   Annual hostility levels reached by India and Pakistan in each annual corresponding 
dispute
1 No militarised action
2 Threat to use force
3 Display of force
4 Use of force
5 War
Years: 1950-2003, Source: Faten et al (2004)
Ledupi1: Log GDP weighted average of India and Pakistan’s per capita education 
expenditures, Years: 1950 to 2005 Sources: Pakistan Economic Survey, Indian Economic 
Survey, Education Statistics 2006 (World Bank), International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF)
Lmilbrd1:  Log of Pakistan’s defence expenditure over Pakistan’s GDP as a ratio of India’s 
defence expenditure over India’s GDP, Years: 1950-2005, Sources: Correlates of war data set 
version 3.02, World Development Indicators 2006 (World Bank), Government Finance 
Statistics Year Book (IMF) and Economic Survey of Pakistan 
Lmilbrd2: Log of India’s defence expenditure over India’s GDP as a ratio of Pakistan’s 
defence expenditure over Pakistan’s GDP, Years: 1950-2005, Sources: Correlates of war data 
set version 3.02, World Development Indicators 2006 (World Bank), Government Finance 
Statistics Year Book (IMF) and Economic Survey of Pakistan 
Lmilbrd 3: Log of Pakistan’s defence expenditure over Pakistan’s GDP as a ratio of 
Pakistan’s defence expenditure over Pakistan’s GDP plus India’s defence expenditure over 
India’s GDP, Years: 1950-2005, Sources: Correlates of war data set version 3.02, World 
Development Indicators 2006 (World Bank), Government Finance Statistics Year Book 
(IMF) and Economic Survey of Pakistan 
Lmilbrd 4: Log of India’s defence expenditure over India’s GDP as a ratio of Pakistan’s 
defence expenditure over Pakistan’s GDP plus India’s defence expenditure over India’s 
GDP, Years: 1950-2005, Sources: Correlates of war data set version 3.02, World 
Development Indicators 2006 (World Bank), Government Finance Statistics Year Book 
(IMF) and Economic Survey of Pakistan 
Lmilbrd5: Log of Mean average of India’s defence expenditure over GDP and Pakistan’s 
defence expenditure over GDP, Years: 1950-2005, Sources: Correlates of war data set 
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version 3.02, World Development Indicators 2006 (World Bank), Government Finance 
Statistics Year Book (IMF) and Economic Survey of Pakistan 
Lmilbrd6: Log GDP weighted average of Pakistan and India’s defence expenditures, Years: 
1950-2005, Sources: Correlates of war data set version 3.02, World Development Indicators 
2006 (World Bank), Government Finance Statistics Year Book (IMF), Economic Survey of 
Pakistan, Economic Survey of India
Lmilppi: Log of Pakistan’s military personnel over Pakistan’s total population as a ratio of 
India’s military personnel over India’s total population, Years: 1950-2001, Sources: 
Correlates of war data set version 3.02 and International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF)
Lmilpip:  Log of India’s military personnel over India’s total population as a ratio of 
Pakistan’s military personnel over Pakistan’s total population. Years: 1950-2001, Sources: 
Correlates of war data set version 3.02 and International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF)
Lmpi1: Log GDP weighted average of Pakistan and India’s total imports, Years: 1950-2005, 
Source: International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF)
Lmpi2: Log mean average of Pakistan’s total imports as a proportion of Pakistan’s GDP 
and India’s total imports as a ratio of India’s GDP, Years: 1950-2005, Source: International 
Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF)
Lxpi1: Log GDP weighted average of Pakistan and India’s total exports, Years: 1950-2001, 
Source: International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF)
Lxpi2: Log mean average of Pakistan’s total exports over Pakistan’s GDP and India’s total 
exports over India’s GDP. Years: 1950-2001, Source: International Financial Statistics 2006 
(IMF)
Poppi: Average of Pakistan’s total population and India’s total population, Years: 1950-
2001, Source: International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF)
Tpitp: Bilateral trade between Pakistan and India as a ratio of Pakistan’s total trade, Years: 
1950-2001, Source: Direction of Trade Statistics yearbook, IMF International Financial 
Statistics 2006 (IMF)
Tpiti: Bilateral trade between Pakistan and India as a ratio of India’s total trade, Years: 1950-
2001, Source: Direction of Trade Statistics yearbook, IMF International Financial Statistics 
2006 (IMF)
Xmpi: Pakistan’s total trade (exports + imports) as a ratio of India’s Total trade (exports + 
imports), Years: 1950-2001, Source: International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF)
 
Xmip: India’s total trade (exports + imports) as a ratio of Pakistan’s total trade (exports + 
imports). Years: 1950-2001, Source: International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF)
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VolFatal: Precise volume of fatality in each annual corresponding dispute, Years: 1950-2003, 
Sources:  COW Inter-State War Data, Version 3.02  (Faten et al, 2004),  CSCW/PRIO Battle 
Deaths data (Lacina, 2005), CSP Data set on Major Episodes of Political Violence 1946-2006 
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